Panzer Leader

Media:	Paperback
Author:	B. H. Liddell Hart, Heinz Guderian, Kenneth MacKsey, Constatine Fitzgibbon, General Heinz Guderian
Publisher:	Da Capo Press
Release date:	24 December, 2001
List price:	~~$18.95~~
Our price:	$12.89 that is 32% off!

Panzer Leader

Average rating: Stars

World War II from the German side

This is a fascinating book from a general who can rightly be called the father of modern armoured warfare. Heinz Guderian was central to the development of Germany's mobile forces and was at the spearhead of the early Blitzkrieg campaigns. After being relieved of command in December 1941, he was recalled in 1943 to become Inspector General of Armoured Troops, with responsibility for re-organising and re-equipping the Panzer forces, and the following year was appointed Chief of the General Staff, a post he held until March 1945.

Guderian's central role in the theory and practice of early mobile warfare, plus his subsequent intimate knowledge of Hitler and the Nazi high command, ensures a classic military memoir. He briefly describes his career up to the outbreak of war in 1939, before giving a detailed day-by-day account of his role in the campaigns of 1939-41 in Poland, France and the USSR, which conveys the hectic, exhausting nature of the German Blitzkrieg. As a battle commander, Guderian was someone who led from the front, seeing it as the best way to get a feel for a battle. He frequently comes under direct enemy fire, at one point casually mentioning an incident where he mans an anti-tank gun himself during an enemy attack. He is the classic Prussian general, imbued with notions of honour and duty; unafraid to speak his mind honestly at all times, a trait which is frequently the cause of friction.

What struck me was how much he dispels the notion that the German army in the early stages of the war was singularly progressive and modern in its approach to mobile warfare, in contrast to the backward thinking of the Allies. In actual fact, apart from Guderian and a small cadre of officers who held mainly corps and divisional commands in the early Blitzkrieg campaigns, the German army was still essentially conservative in its thinking, with most of the General staff still wedded to notions of static, positional warfare. Guderian's desire to be given a free hand to drive deep and fast into the enemy after the breakthrough at Sedan in France in 1940 is constantly hampered by the timidity and nervousness of the high command at the speed of his advance. This reticence even comes from von Kleist, to whom Guderian reported and who controlled the Panzer Group which formed the spearhead of the drive to the channel coast. His frustration reaches its peak before Dunkirk, as he is prevented from destroying the BEF by Hitler's controversial halt order.

In Operation Barbarossa, we see a commander at the peak of his powers, as his Panzer Group slices through the Soviet army in the drive on Smolensk. Hitler and the army high command however begin to dither over the strategic direction of the invasion. Guderian favours an all-out offensive on Moscow, instead however the axis of the advance is shifted southwards towards the strategically less important objective of Kiev, an offensive that eats up time, men and material. Once the advance on Moscow is resumed, winter intervenes, while his divisions suffer from lack of rest and reinforcements. His exhausted army finally grinds to a halt before Tula and is then pushed back by the Russian counter-attack in late December 1941. Following a disagreement with the volatile von Kluge, he is relieved of his command on dubious grounds.

After a period in the wilderness, he is recalled to active service in 1943 and finally ends his career as Chief of the General Staff. It is hard when reading Guderian's account of this stage of the war not to sympathise with him, his doomed efforts at staving off defeat would be tragic were the regime he served not so evil. He appears the only sane person among Hitler and his coterie of sycophants and fanatics. He is bitterly critical of senior army figures like Keitel, Bergdorf and Jodl, regarding them as guilty of strategic miscalculation and misjudgement, an unwillingness to confront or oppose Hitler at crucial moments and a basic lack of appreciation for conditions at the front and the strengths and weaknesses of the field army. The many incompetent and venal Nazi party officials to be found among Hitler's entourage are no better, Himmler for example is described as a "military ignoramus". The endless daily conferences with Hitler are largely exercises in futility; all sound military advice goes unheeded in the face of the Fuhrer's irrational belief in the inevitability of a final victory. Albert Speer constantly sends memoranda advising the war is lost, all of which Hitler locks in his safe, regarding them as too depressing to read. Any chance of mounting even a reasonable defence against the Soviet steamroller advance is dashed through Hitler's incomprehensibly daft decision making; valuable reserves are squandered in the Ardennes offensive, dozens of divisions are left stranded in secondary theatres or abandoned behind the front line in Courland and the Baltic coast, while the defence of Budapest is prioritised over that of Berlin. Hitler's withdrawal into irrationality and fantasy is well-documented elsewhere, yet here is often cuttingly described by Guderian. One blackly comic scene sees the minutes of a previous conference being called up after Hitler attempts to offload the blame for one of his rash decisions onto the front line generals. Guderian experiences grim satisfaction as Hitler arrives at the passage detailing his own culpability, and then promptly stops reading. Defeat of course is inevitable, and Guderian is dismissed in March 1945, after speaking his mind once too often.

Like so many other memoirs by those who fought for or served the Nazi regime, Panzer Leader has a familiar self-exculpatory element present, and a word of caution is therefore necessary for anyone approaching this book. Guderian expresses little regret or remorse for his part in the Second World War and there is predictably a strict bias in favour of his homeland, which is undiminished by time or any post-war realisation of the diabolical nature of Hitler and the Nazi regime. Anything outside of purely military matters is dismissed as "politics" and hence none of the army's concern. He therefore claims innocence of any knowledge of the Final Solution or the activities of the SS Einsatzgruppen in the eastern territories, and even with the benefit of hindsight refuses to comment on this aspect of the regime he served, remarking that his memoir is meant to solely reflect his thoughts and feelings as they stood during the war. He is critical of the July plot against Hitler, declaring it dishonourable, which if it had succeeded would have drawn against the army a population still largely supportive of the regime, not to mention the entire power structure of the Nazi state and the SS. The Allies' demand for unconditional surrender would have also still stood, with or without Hitler, thus compelling Germany to fight on. Despite these seemingly rational arguments, Guderian cannot be excused from the failure of the officer class to stand against Nazism and Hitler. Like so many others, he waives responsibility through a reliance on notions of honour and loyalty to a legitimate government. Frequent protestations as to Hitler's policies and decisions as being detrimental to Germany and its people are insufficient to invoke a willingness to assist in his removal. In the context of the era, Guderian was hardly a war criminal, and conducted himself at all times in accordance with the rules of warfare. However his memoir does not serve as a vehicle for his absolute redemption. Nonetheless, Panzer Leader is a gripping book.

Panzer Leader - B. H. Liddell Hart, Heinz Guderian, Kenneth MacKsey, Constatine Fitzgibbon, General Heinz Guderian

A Book For Anyone Who Studies World War II

For years I had known about Generaloberst Heinz Guderians achievements or at least I thought so. After reading his wonderfully written memoirs, I understood why the Eastern Front became so fragile and ultimately lost by German forces. Guderian sheds a lot of light on incidents reported during the war but ultimately fabrications by Soviet propaganda.

But the book doesn't just focus on the Eastern Front, though that does play a large majority in the books length. The Western Front is spoken on aswell as the ranks Guderian soared through during the war. And at the end, Guderian speaks on the leading personalities of the Third Reich. This book shows a lot of detail on the mind of Hitler, as Guderian was quite frequently with Hitler and also arguing situations with Hitler [which only a rare few did so]. Other personalities spoken about include: Himmler, Goebbles, Speer and Goering.

Panzer Leader is perhaps the most detailed account on the formation of the Panzer Armies that blitzed their way through Poland, France, Africa and Russia before slowly being halted by overpowering numbers, corrupt leadership and ultimately, lack of supplies.

This is a book for anyone who has studied that great and costly war, but still lacks some key info on the conditions which led to victory and defeat. Guderian truely belongs among the greats.

B. H. Liddell Hart, Heinz Guderian, Kenneth MacKsey, Constatine Fitzgibbon, General Heinz Guderian - Panzer Leader

Guderian is the King of Armored warfare

Expertly laid out. Provides in depth views into the problems developing an armored force withing the Reich's beaurocracy. I have a profound respect for this man's genious. He even confronts Hitler over troop realignment and Panzer R&D, which led to his unpopularity in the Reichschancellory. I guess it is good Hitler and his cronies made life difficult for Guderian, or things may have gone another way.

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